Open Architecture Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System: Security Enhancement with Defense-in-Depth Strategies

International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT)          
© 2017 by IJCTT Journal
Volume-54 Number-1
Year of Publication : 2017
Authors : Alade, A.A, Ajayi, O.B, Okolie, S.O, Alao, O.D, Akinsanya, A.O, Eze, M.O, Ebiesuwa Seun
DOI :  10.14445/22312803/IJCTT-V54P110


Alade, A.A, Ajayi, O.B, Okolie, S.O, Alao, O.D, Akinsanya, A.O, Eze, M.O, Ebiesuwa Seun "Open Architecture Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System: Security Enhancement with Defense-in-Depth Strategies". International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) V54(1):56-62, December 2017. ISSN:2231-2803. Published by Seventh Sense Research Group.

Abstract -
The function of the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System is to monitor and control physical processes in real time in a geographi-cally spread environment. SCADA system is applied in supervision and control of devices action in electricity distribution, transmission; oil and gas pipelines, water distribution, and traffic lights among other critical in-frastructure. Deregulation of electricity sector in Nige-ria provides private independent power producers’ ac-cess to the Transmission Company of Nigeria network and hence transforms the closed (isolated) SCADA Sys-tem of the TCN to an open architecture SCADA System. An open architecture SCADA System is susceptible to threats and attacks within and without with catastrophic impact on the efficiency of the critical infrastructure it is designed to monitor and control. Using empirical method, the type of threats and level of exposure of the TCN SCADA System were examined. The investigation revealed that TCN SCADA System is majorly protected against internal threats. Hence security enhancement through Defense-in-depth strategies that would provide wide arrays of security were proposed and briefly elaborated on for successful implementation.

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Defense-in-depth, Firewalls, Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Policy and Procedures, Remote Terminal Units (RTU), Risk Assessments, Security Zones, SCADA, Threats and Vulnerability.